Category: Philosophy of Time

  • Feser on Koons on relative actuality

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    In a recent blog post, Edward Feser outlines a problem he sees with Rob Koons’ usage of relative actuality/potentiality to explain how an Aristotelian B-theorist might explain the reality of change. If you want to see Koons’ proposal then take a look at section 6 of his paper or take a look at Feser’s brief summary of it →

  • Eternity’s relation to time

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    A few months ago, reader Ante asked this question on my What I Believe page: I am very much struggling how to combine a presentist account of time (like the A-theory for example) and the view that God is outside of time, in a Thomistic sense. I would be very thankful for your help, since it seems to →

  • McTaggart and meta-time

    There is what I take to be an error common among my fellow Thomists regarding change and certain theories of time. Put tersely, this error says that the B-theory of time is committed to the Parmenidian denial of change. I had decided to write something about it, but after doing a bit of research, it →

  • Craig’s timeless moment sans creation

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    William Lange Craig’s model of how God relates to time can be stated succinctly: God is timeless sans creation, and temporal since creation.[1] The reason we word it like this is obvious: he can’t be timeless before creation, since before-ness is a temporal relation and creation includes time itself. Craig holds this view largely because he →

  • A Case for Chronons

    Chronons are the discrete quantum of time. In other words they are the smallest (or indivisible) length of time. Naturally, if we think chronons exist, then we must hold that time is discrete. Admittedly, if we say chronons exist we have the following weird result: Two balls, each with a 10cm diameter, are moving in →