There are loads of different cosmological arguments out there and hopefully someday I’ll be able to write blog posts about some of them. Right now, however, I want to share an interesting version I came up with, thanks to an argument from Alexander Pruss: define a “simple existential fact” to be a true proposition reporting simply the existence or non-existence of a specific being[1,2]. So U doesn’t exist, where U is any specific unicorn and Roland exists, where Roland is me, are simple existential facts of the actual world. Now, let K be the conjunction of all simple existential facts of the actual world that don’t involve necessary beings. So, K only reports the existence or non-existence of beings which possibly fail to exist.
Now assume that possibly, K has an explanation. From this it follows that a necessary being exists. We now show this: Let α denote the actual world. Since possibly, K has an explanation, there is some possible world w, in which K is true and there is some fact q that explains K. Since K involves existential facts, q must involve the causal activity of some being that exists in w, call it N. Now either N exists in α or it doesn’t. Assume it doesn’t. Then N doesn’t exist is a conjunct of K. Since K is true at w, it follows that N doesn’t exist in w. But this is a contradiction. Therefore, N exists in α. Is N necessary? Well, assume N isn’t necessary. Then N exists is a conjunct of K, and in w, N explains its own existence. But surely, nothing contingent can explain its own existence. So N is a necessarily existent being.
What’s really nice about this argument is that it doesn’t assume S5 or even the Brouwer axiom. Furthermore, even though I think the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true, to say that K has an explanation doesn’t commit one to the full-blown PSR. In fact, to say that possibly, K has an explanation doesn’t even entail that K actually has an explanation: while N could explain K, N needn’t actually explain K.
- “Specific” has a specific meaning here: rigidly designated. A rigid designator always refers to the same entity and is different from a definite description which changes depending on the current state of affairs. For example, “the president of the United States” is a definite description, whereas “Richard Nixon” is a rigid designator (of course, if there were more than one Richard Nixon we could be talking about, then some more specificity would be needed).
- I wonder if I couldn’t simplify this even further by saying “a specific being or class of beings” where class could be something like “unicorns”?
- That is, α is the rigid designator for this possible world.
- This was discussed very briefly here. It doesn’t seem possible to explain the existence of contingent beings “conceptually”.