• Contrastive probabilistic explanation

    I want to propose something I’m not totally convinced is correct, but that I think is worth considering. In general we have the question about contrastive indeterministic explanation: an antecedent A can give rise to two different consequences B and C, it actually gives rise to B, and we want to know why it gave rise to B rather than C. There are two cases that encode this, each prima facie in different ways (though they may be ultima facie reducible to the same case, more on this later): libertarian free choice and quantum indeterminism. Let’s take them in turn. In…

  • Uninstantiatables in Aristotelian Mathematics

    Any successful Aristotelian foundations of mathematics needs to account for mathematical objects that are uninstantiated and even uninstantiatable. Examples include (1) positive whole (or “natural”) numbers larger than the number of objects in reality, (2) negative numbers, and (3) infinities. Uninstantiated natural numbers As the Aristotelian sees things, we abstract quantity and structure from reality, isolate certain aspects of these (which we call axioms), and extend these abstracted notions beyond our experience. Call these three stages abstraction, isolation, and extension respectively. Even though we can technically distinguish between isolation and extension, in practice these two steps occur together in the…

  • Smith’s epistemological argument for hylomorphism

    The following quote comes from Wolfgang Smith’s The Quantum Enigma: As Aristotle pointed out long ago, the act of knowing consists in a certain union of the intellect with its object. But how can the intellect be joined to the external thing? Such a union, clearly, can only be conceived in terms of a third entity or common element, which object and subject can both possess, each in its own appropriate mode; and it just be this tertium quid, precisely, that renders the object knowable. But only in part! For it is not, after all, the external object — lock,…

  • How Aristotle starts the Nicomachean Ethics

    In the opening passage of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle seeks to pick out the specific subject of his study for the remainder of the book. His discussion is often misunderstood, but a good understanding of it will serve us well in understanding the study of ethics. We will consider the passage bit by bit with comments and clarifications as we go along, doing our best to read it according to the principle of charity. The good has the nature of an end Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good;…

  • How can a loving God send people to hell?

    I was recently asked to contribute a piece for a local Christian magazine called Scope Magazine, on the topic of how a loving God could send people to hell. Below is the unedited version I sent them. The official (and slightly edited) version can be read online here. Perhaps one of the most uncomfortable Christian doctrines is the doctrine of hell. How is it, the question goes, that a loving God can send people to hell? Surely a God who truly loved all of mankind would allow everyone, without exception, into heaven? It seems to me, however, that reality is not…

  • From morality to nature and back again

    Below is a talk I recently gave at a local apologetics meet-up. The goal was to introduce and partially defend natural law theory to a group of fellow-Protestants who, as far as I was aware, had not engaged extensively with natural law theory before. The talk was recorded in various parts, with video coming in the second part. At the end there is a collection of resources for those interested in some further reading. In our previous meeting I got the impression that my views on morality as an Aristotelian and Thomist are particularly different from the views of many of you here,…

  • That orders regulate

    In Summa Theologica II-I Q87 A1 corp. Aquinas says the following: Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment. The idea is that when one is directed (or “ordered”) toward an end,…

  • Lonergan on Aquinas on Causation

    Below is an excerpt from Bernard Lonergan’s incredible book Grace and Freedom, discussing Thomas Aquinas’s views on causation and how they relate to Aristotle’s views on the topic. Except for the term “actio” I’ve replaced Latin phrases with their English translations in square brackets. Causation is the common feature of both operation and cooperation; its nature is of fundamental importance in this inquiry. But if St Thomas certainly disagreed with Hume, who held causation to be purely subjective, it is less clear what object he considered to constitute the objective reference of the proposition “A causes B.” Was causation for…

  • On the transitivity of strict preference

    The notion of comparing alternatives often comes up in philosophy, particularly when discussing practical reason. There are various names for this (we can talk about the reasons for choosing A over B, or how A is better than B, or how A is more desirable to B, or how A is preferred to B) but they all amount to the same thing. The other day I was reading the SEP article on preference and was struck by this counterexample to transitivity of strict preference (I recall my friends mentioning it to me in the past, but I only thought about…

  • Virtual existence

    It might not seem like it, but a proper understanding of virtual existence can be significantly helpful when trying to understand the structure of human communities. To this end, I’d like to spend some time thinking about this puzzling notion here. Substances and aggregates again You’ll recall that, in our discussions about substantial activities, we spent a fair amount of time introducing the notion of substance. There we said that a substance is something which has intrinsic directedness towards an end, or equivalently something which has intrinsic causal powers. The guiding intuition here is that when a substance does something it…